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21 Introduction
An almost inevitable byproduct of divorce is the issue of the allocation of custodial rights
over a child. In the United States, the divorce rate started to increase sharply in the 1960s
(Gruber 2004). According to Rasul (2006), one million children in the United States have to
survive the difficult process of divorce proceedings every year. A few decades ago, mothers
were typically granted the sole custody of a child in the event of divorce under the argument
that maternal care is more important to nurture a child (Brinig and Buckley 1998). With
the introduction of joint custody laws in the United States around 1973, both parents were
given equal preference for custodial rights. As discussed in Nunley and Seals (2011a), joint
custody can either mean joint legal custody or joint physical custody. In either of the cases,
important decisions regarding the child have to be agreed upon by both parents.
Arguments have been forwarded both in favor of (e.g., Brinig and Buckley 1998) and
against (e.g., Singer and Reynolds 1988) joint custody laws. Proponents of joint custody
law suggest that it fosters more emotional and financial involvement on the part of the
parents, and this extra involvement is better for children. Opponents of the joint custody
law suggest that, following divorce, children are better off being cared for by the primary
caregiver, and provision of joint custody might lead to an unhealthy domestic environment
for the upbringing of a child.
Rasul (2006) provides a theoretical framework to investigate the economics behind joint
custody. In Rasul’s model, joint custody is optimal if the parent who attaches more impor-
tance to the development of the child keeps the majority of custodial rights. However, this
result hinges on the assumption that the preferences for child development are relatively ho-
mogeneous. With sufficiently heterogeneous parental preferences for child development, sole
custody is optimal. If the allocation of child custodial rights is not optimal, then it distorts
the investment incentives for parents, and investment in children might be less than optimal.
This is an interesting insight worthy of empirical investigation. Rasul’s model provides us
3with a framework in which joint custody laws may actually harm a child’s future prospects.
Investment in a child is intended for human capital formation. If, as a consequence of the
provision of joint custody, a child has access only to sub-optimal levels of resources while
growing up, then it will adversely affect the stock of human capital the child will posses in
the future when entering the labor market. Hence, the adoption of a joint custody law could
have a significant impact on labor supply and the productivity of the labor force.
This study attempts to explore the impact of growing up in a joint custody law regime on
future adult outcomes. In particular, I examine the consequences of children being exposed
to a joint custody law regime on both educational outcomes (years of education, high school
dropout, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate) and labor market outcomes
(real total income, percentage income over poverty line, weeks worked, real wage income, and
employed). For my analysis, I am using 50 years of census data obtained from the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series and a difference-in-differences (DiD) panel fixed-effect model.
My results show that being introduced to joint custody laws as a child adversely affects
future educational and labor market outcomes.
2 Background
Before the introduction of joint custody laws in the USA around 1973, mothers were
overwhelmingly granted custodial rights in case of a divorce (Brinig and Buckley 1998). The
logic behind such decisions was based on the argument that maternal care is more important
for the development of a child. However, with the introduction of joint custody laws, fathers
were also granted partial custodial rights of their children. The joint custody laws have
made custodial rights gender neutral and are more focused on the best interests of the child.
When divorced parents share the custody of a child, they need to make decisions regarding
the child’s development jointly. This system is supposed to be more conducive to a child’s
4overall development. The idea is that a decision made by one parent and that may be clearly
detrimental to a child’s future well being can be blocked by the other parent (Brinig and
Buckley 1998).
Rasul (2006) serves as the theoretical background for this paper. According to this study,
joint custody laws have both “efficiency and distributional consequences”. Each spouse’s
share of marital surplus is determined by the share of custodial rights. If the allocation of a
child’s custodial rights are made ex ante, then it will maximize investment in the child and
minimize the likelihood of divorce. However, it is not feasible for couples to decide beforehand
the level of resources that are going to be invested in a child. Hence, it is more than likely that
the allocation of a child’s custodial rights, conditional upon divorce, is going to be decided
ex post. Any kind of ex post allocation of child custody will maximize ex ante investment
only if the couples have sufficiently heterogeneous preferences for child development. Here,
by ‘ex ante’ we mean before the parents get divorced and ‘ex post ’ identifies the post-divorce
situation. If the spouses have sufficiently heterogeneous preferences for child development,
then it is optimal for the high-valuation parent to have the sole custody. However, for spouses
with relatively homogeneous preferences of child development, joint custody is optimal if
the high-valuation parent keeps the majority of custodial rights. Hence, joint custody is
not universally optimal and the allocation of the child’s custody should ideally depend on
parental preferences for child development.
Even in cases where joint custody is preferred, it is in the best interests of a child that the
high-valuation parent retains the majority of custodial rights. The problem for the judicial
system, however, is the fact that the court does not have all the information. For example,
the court does not know how spouses value child development. Even determining the high-
valuation parent is riddled with problems. Respective monetary investments in children
made by parents may give a distorted view of parent’s preferences for child development,
since investment can also be non-monetary, such as through the investment of time. This
5information asymmetry creates a situation where, the best interests of a child might not be
served by granting both parents an equal share of child custody.
The Coasian Irrelevance Theorem holds in Rasul’s (2006) model if child custody rights
are treated just as other property rights and parents bargain over them simultaneously.
Hence, the parent with higher valuation for child development will trade other property
rights to gain better custody rights through bargaining. Introduction of a joint custody law
marks a shift in the spousal bargaining power within a household. Before the introduction
of joint custody laws, mothers were usually expected to receive sole custody of children
in case of a divorce. Since joint custody laws made the process of granting child custody
gender-neutral, mothers’ bargaining position was weakened. This outcome of joint custody
laws has important ramifications for the human capital formation of children coming from
a separated household. It has been suggested by Lundberg et al. (1997) that a weakened
bargaining position for mothers leads to lower investment in children. Hence, joint custody
laws, as well-intentioned as they might be, have the ability to hurt the future prospects of a
child whose parents have divorced.
Brinig and Buckley (1998), using bonding and monitoring theories, suggest that joint
custody laws lead to fewer divorces and higher child support payments. Bonding theories
predict that a father will be more emotionally attached to a child if he is expected to keep
some ties with the child after divorce. If a state implements joint custody laws, then the
fathers living in that state can expect to retain custodial rights of children if and when
a divorce takes place. Monitoring theories predict that a parent will be more willing to
contribute financially to a child’s development if some sort of custodial rights are granted.
The key idea is that a parent is willing to invest more if that parent can monitor how the
money intended for investment in the child is being spent, then the parent may be willing to
invest more. So, even in case of a court mandated child support payment, a parent might be
willing to pay more to make sure the child has access to sufficient resources, if the investment
6can be monitored. Joint custody laws allow for such provisions, and, therefore, are more
conducive for the human capital formation of a child coming from a broken household.
However, granting joint custody of a child to both parents also has its pitfalls. Brinig and
Buckley (1998) suggest three possible scenarios where granting joint custody instead of sole
custody may be harmful for the child. In the first scenario, joint custody may be awarded
to unfit fathers. This may prove to be against a child’s best interests since it hampers the
developmental process of the child. Brinig and Buckley (1998) argue that, since both parents
can monitor a child under a joint custody setting, such issues are unlikely to arise. In the
second scenario, a parent may need to forgo other property rights in a divorce settlement
in order to gain the sole custody rights of a child. However, Brinig and Buckley (1998)
suggest that it does not necessarily make joint custody laws a bad initiative. In the third
case, joint custody laws might as well become inactive if couples use it as a bargaining chip
instead of an effective instrument to serve the best interests of a child whose parents are
divorcing. Brinig and Buckley (1998), however, argue that this kind of Coasian Irrelevance
might not work in reality since people in general might be unwilling to trade their children
for assets or those arrangements might not meet the legal requirements. Using data from
the Statistical Abstracts of the United States for the years between 1980-1991, and with the
help of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Fixed Effect
methods, they find that joint custody laws reduce divorce levels. Child support payments
are also positively influenced by the joint custody laws.
The critics of joint custody laws, however, insist that implementing them is a bad idea
(e.g., Singer and Reynolds 1988) and the system under which a court assigns a “primary
caretaker” is better.
Using the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) from the United States Cen-
sus for 1980 and 1990 waves and a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) method, Nunley and Seals
(2011a) find that following the implementation of joint custody laws, parental investment
in children (e.g., private school attendance) may actually decline. Since joint custody laws
7weaken the bargaining power of mothers, they tend to develop more market-specific skills to
be better placed at the bargaining table in case of a divorce. They interpret the results to
mean that fathers give investment in a child lower importance following joint custody law
implementations.
In a related study, Nunley and Seals (2011b), with the help of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) dataset, find that following the introduction of joint custody laws, there
are changes in the within-household dynamics with mothers working outside of the home
more often whereas fathers increase the propensity of working at home. According to them,
since fathers can expect to see their children more often following divorce, they decide to
develop skills more suitable for the upbringing of a child. This leads to a reduction in the
amount of time spent on outside work. Mothers, however, need not invest so much time
developing skills solely for housework since fathers will also share some responsibilities of
household work. Hence, mothers can now spend more time working outside of the house.
This is another signal of the changed bargaining dynamics inside a household following the
introduction of joint custody laws.
Leo (2008) uses US census data to find evidence that children from divorced or separated
households will do better academically if they grow up in a joint custody law state. In
another recent working paper, Chen (2013) finds that exposure to joint custody laws during
childhood reduces the likelihood of high school graduation by about 2 percentage points.
Halla (2013) suggests that joint custody law implementations are responsible for higher
marriage and fertility rates as well as higher divorce rates. He also finds evidence of a
declining labor market participation for females. However, he does not take into account
whether the respondents were exposed to joint custody law regimes as children, nor does
he explore labor market outcomes of the well-being of the population. The main source
of Halla’s data is the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) maintained by the National
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). He uses a DiD panel fixed-effects model for the purpose
of his investigation.
8The main theme emerging from the existing literature is that the overall impact of joint
custody laws on children is ambiguous. The empirical literature is completely silent (at
least to this researcher’s best knowledge) on the long run impact of joint custody laws on
children. This paper contributes to the existing literature by investigating how joint custody
laws affect the future educational and labor market outcomes of children growing up under
joint custody law regimes. As Rasul (2006) suggests, joint custody laws might influence the
parental decision-making process of investment in child development. That means children
might not have access to the optimal level of resources while growing up. This can hamper
their ability to form the optimal level of human capital and, in turn, negatively affect future
labor supply and labor force productivity. Hence, it is important to investigate whether
joint custody laws indeed have such effects. I also investigate the results for male and female
subsamples separately to evaluate any gender-based discrimination in resource allocation.
My research design allows me to identify both long run and short run effects.
3 Data and Methodology
State level changes in the joint custody laws in the United States have taken place over
the years. Indiana was the first state to implement joint custody laws in 1973, followed by
New Hampshire in 1974. Arkansas was the latest state to implement joint custody laws in
2003. Washington and West Virginia are the only two states that have not implemented
joint custody laws. The timeline of implementation of joint custody laws, along with other
divorce related laws (unilateral divorce laws, no fault divorce laws, equitable division of
property laws) is given in table 1.
I use the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA) for the United States
census years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. This database is a collection of high-precision
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samples obtained from the United States census data (Ruggles et al., 2010). I am using the
1% State sample for the five census years. Following Gruber (2004), I collapse the data
into state of residence/state of birth/year/age/sex cells. This setting can be justified as the
variations in law come at the state/year/age levels (Gruber 2004). This methodology has also
been followed elsewhere in the economics literature (e.g., Wolfers 2006, Alesina and Giuliano
2007). In my modified data, each cell becomes the mean of observations for a particular
combination of state of residence, state of birth, year, age, and sex. While obtaining the
mean I use personal weights so that my data incorporate the underlying microstructure of the
American population. A shortened version of the data is provided in Table 1 for illustrative
purposes. Table 2 shows how various laws relevant to our current analysis evolved over the
years.
For my analysis, I include only the individuals who were born in the United States, are
within the age range of 25-50 years, are not enrolled in school, and are earning a non-negative
amount of income. I restrict the maximum amount of income to $500,000. I also discard the
observations for which worker class, weeks worked, and poverty index data are not available.
Observations from the prison inmate population are not included in this study either.
There are nine outcome variables which can be broadly classified into two categories:
educational outcomes (years of education, high school dropout, high school graduate, some
college, and college graduate), and labor market outcomes (real total income, percentage
income over poverty line, weeks worked, real wage income, and employed). The variable
years of education is the total number of years a person has been in school. High school
dropout, high school graduate, and college graduate are all indicator variables taking a value
of 1 if an individual falls into the specified category and 0 otherwise. Some college takes
the value of 1 if an individual has been to college but never graduated. Real total income
and real wage income are price adjusted income variables, where the adjustment factors are
supplied by IPUMS. The price adjustment converts all income variables to the year 2000
level in real terms. Percentage income over poverty line is the value of one hundred times a
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Table 3: Sample Means of Outcome Variables for Adult Females and Males
Pooled Adult Female Adult Male
Years of Education 12.003 12.130 11.893
High School Dropout 0.357 0.361 0.354
High School Graduate 0.122 0.138 0.109
Some College 0.275 0.277 0.273
College Graduate 0.144 0.140 0.148
Real Total Income ($) 36043.56 20334.5 49600.6
Above Poverty 318.492 319.147 317.926
Weeks Worked 3.623 3.319 3.885
Real Wage Income ($) 31785.82 18189.53 43519.54
Employed 0.890 0.810 0.958
No. of Observations 221303 102515 118788
Note: Source- Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA)
for the United States census years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000
person’s income divided by the poverty level income. A value of 200 will therefore mean that
the individual’s income is 200% above the poverty threshold. This acts as an indicator of
well-being in our model. Weeks worked is an index for the number of weeks worked. It takes
values from zero to four. Weeks worked is zero if no work is done by an individual, 1 if 1-13
weeks have been worked, 2 if 14-26 weeks, 3 if 27-39 weeks, and 4 if 40-52 weeks have been
worked. Employed is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if an individual is employed.
Again, I am collapsing my data by state/year/age levels, for each age from 25-50, for a total
of 26 age years, classified into 51 states of residence including the District of Columbia, and
further classified into 51 states of births, ordered by year and separated by sex. Hence, each
cell of my modified data corresponds to the cell mean for all the observations falling into a
particular combination of state of residence, state of birth, year, age, and gender.
The purpose of the study is to see whether growing up in a joint custody law regime
has an economically relevant impact on an individual in the future. To capture whether
13
an individual was introduced to a joint custody law regime while growing up, I use the
information about an individual’s year of birth to calculate whether the joint custody law
was implemented in that individual’s state of birth by the time she turned 18. I estimate
a difference-in-differences (DiD) panel fixed effect model (e.g., Gruber 2004, Wolfers 2006,
Halla 2011) for the set of my outcome variables. Following Gruber (2004), the model can be
written as follows:
Outcomeasbt = α + β1CUSTODYst + β2KIDCUSTabt + β3RACEast
+β4KIDUNILATst + β5KIDNOFLTst + β6KIDEQUITst
+β7ηa + β8σb + β9δs + β10τt + β11ηa ∗ τt + asbt (1)
Here, Outcome identifies any of the outcome variables. Subscript a denotes age, s rep-
resents current state of residence, b stands for state of birth, and t identifies the year.
CUSTODY is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a joint custody law is im-
plemented in a state in a given year, KIDCUST takes on the value of 1 if joint custody law
was in effect in the state of birth before age 18, RACE includes white and black indicator
variables. KIDUNILAT , KIDNOFLT , and KIDEQUIT are binary variables taking the
value of 1 if unilateral divorce laws, no fault divorce laws, and equitable property laws were
in effect in the state of birth before age 18, respectively. ηa, σb, δs, τt are binary variables for
age groups, state of birth, current state of residence, and year, respectively. ηa ∗ τt is the set
of interaction terms for age groups and year. Gruber (2004) suggests that this interaction
term can capture age specific variances over time. I have divided the age range into the
following groups: 25-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50. The indicator variable KIDCUST is
constructed following the standard procedure in labor economics (e.g., Gruber 2004, Wolfers
2006). The information about the state of residence of an individual is only available for the
year of birth and the current census year.
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There can be two possible sources of bias in my analysis. First, bias may come from
time invariant omitted variables influencing both my outcomes and the joint custody law
implementations. Since we are carrying out the analysis at the state level, state fixed effects
should be sufficient to account for this kind of time invariant bias (Angrist and Pischke
2009). I have included current state of residence, state of birth, and time fixed effects in
my model. This procedure essentially follows a least squares dummy variable approach
(LSDV). Another source of bias may stem from the inability to account for the unobserved
trends in the implementation of joint custody laws. May be the states where custody battles
are on the rise, are also the states implementing the joint custody laws. Following Gruber
(2004), I include linear time trends for current state of residence and state of birth. Gruber
(2004) suggests that including trends can sufficiently address the issue of bias coming from
unobserved trends. Also, if the directions of results without including trends hold even after
the inclusion of trend, then endogeneity through time-varying unobserved heterogeneity is
not an issue for our estimates. Nunley and Seals (2011a) and Halla (2011) suggest that there
has been no systematic implementation of joint custody laws in the United States over the
years. Combining all variables the model can be re-written as:
Outcomeasbt = α + β1CUSTODYst + β2KIDCUSTabt + β3RACEast
+β4KIDUNILATst + β5KIDNOFLTst + β6KIDEQUITst + β7ηa + β8σb
+β9δs + β10τt + β11ηa ∗ τt + β12δs ∗ Trends+ β13σb ∗ Trends+ asbt (2)
To account for autocorrelation within the state of residence/state of birth cells over the
years, I cluster over state of residence*state of birth*year (e.g., Gruber 2004, Bertrand et al.
2004). The standard errors are also corrected for possible heteroskedasticity.
As can be seen from Table 2, the joint custody law came into effect in various states in
the United States between 1973-2003. This within-states over-time variation allows me to
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use a DiD panel fixed model. My model is identified by the variation in the timing of joint
custody law implementation in different states. I control for unilateral divorce laws, no fault
divorce laws, and equitable property laws to make sure that I am calculating the effect of
joint custody law itself, and not of any other law changes.
I run the regression for male and female subsamples separately, and also pool the sub-
samples. In addition, I run the regressions with and without current state of residence and
state of birth specific trends.
Sample means of the outcome variables for the whole modified data are provided in Table
3. Means for the male and female subsamples are also provided.
4 Results
The model specification allows us to investigate effects of the existence of joint custody
laws both during childhood (through the coefficient of KIDCUST ) and contemporaneously
(through the coefficient of CUSTODY ). We are mainly interested in the coefficient of KID-
CUST since we want to measure the effects of growing up under the joint custody laws.
In Tables 4 and 5, I provide the estimation results for all adults pooled sample, male
subsample, and female subsample. Tables 4 contains the results for the educational outcomes.
Tables 5 shows the results for the labor market outcomes. The first column in these tables for
each sample (pooled, male, female) gives the results from the model without trends (equation
1), and the second column gives the results from the model with trends (equation 2).
For the educational outcomes in the pooled sample (Table 4, columns I and II), if children
grow up under joint custody laws, total years of education decreases by 0.066 years when the
model doesn’t have a trend. This corresponds to a fall by 0.6% of the sample mean. With
a trend present, total years of education is reduced by 0.081 years, or 0.7% of the mean.
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We need to note that none of these estimates are statistically significant. Being exposed to
joint custody laws as children raises the likelihood of being a high school dropout by 0.028
percentage points without trend (7.8% of the sample mean) and by 0.014 percentage points
with trends (3.9% of the sample mean). Both of these estimates are statistically significant.
Growing up in a joint custody law regime also raises the odds of being a high school graduate
by 0.01 percentage points (8.2% of the sample mean) in the model without trend. When
a child is exposed to joint custody laws, it lowers the odds of the child graduating from
college by 0.01 percentage points (7% of the mean), and the likelihood of the child attending
some college at all by 0.019 percentage points (7% of the mean). These estimates refer to
the model without trend and are statistically significant. The estimates retain their signs in
the model with trend. The rise in high school graduation with a concurrent fall in college
graduation may imply that there is a resource constraint for the children whose parents have
divorced. A similar argument is made by Gruber (2004) for unilateral divorce laws.
According to Table 4 (III and IV columns), for the female subsample, growing up in a joint
custody regime means that the likelihood of being a high school dropout goes up by 0.012
percentage points and the likelihood of being a college graduate falls by 0.020 percentage
points, for the model with trends. These estimates are also statistically significant. Years
of education falls for growing up under joint custody laws and the odds of graduating high
school rise, although they are no longer statistically significant.
For the male subsample (Table 4, columns V and VI), being exposed to a joint custody
regime as a child raises the likelihood of being a high school dropout by 0.016 percentage
points, in the model with trends. The likelihoods of going to college and graduating from
college fall by 0.014 and 0.032 percentage points respectively, in the model with trends.
In the category of labor market outcomes for the pooled sample (Table 5, columns I
and II), being exposed to a joint custody law regime reduces real total income by $2,373
(6.6% of the sample mean) and real wage income by $1,989 (6.3% of the sample mean), for
18
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the model with trends. The percentage income above the poverty threshold also falls by
9.92 percentage points and weeks worked by 0.022 (0.6% of mean). The likelihood of being
employed decreases by 0.013 percentage points (1.5% of the sample mean). We notice that
the signs of the coefficients remain the same for our models with and without trend, and the
absolute values of the estimates are also close. This is an indication that our model results
are robust.
Columns III and IV of Table 5 show the labor market outcomes of growing up under joint
custody laws for the female subsample. According to the model with trends, growing up in
a joint custody regime leads to a decrease in real total income of $991 and real wage income
by $759. The percentage income above the poverty threshold falls by 7.426 percentage
points and weeks worked by 0.04. The likelihood of being employed is also reduced by 0.02
percentage points. Again, in all these instances, the directions (sign) remain the same for
the models with trends and the models without trends.
In Table 5 columns V and VI, the male subsample results for the labor market outcomes
are consistent with the results in the previous results tables. Being exposed to joint custody
laws as a child decreases real total income by $3,964 and real wage income by $3,387. The
percentage income over the poverty threshold falls by about 13 percentage points and weeks
worked by 0.015. The likelihood of being employed also goes down by 0.009 percentage
points.
5 Discussion
Rasul (2006) lays the theoretical foundations for our present analysis. Rasul argues that
sole custody is optimal if parents have sufficiently heterogeneous preferences for child de-
velopment. If parents have relatively homogeneous preferences for child development, then
joint custody is optimal assuming the high-valuation parent retains the majority share of
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the custodial rights. In practice, the court does not have all the information about parental
preferences when making child custody decisions. This kind of information asymmetry may
lead to less than optimal outcomes. Hence, joint custody may be granted where sole custody
is warranted, and vice versa. If custodial allocations are not efficient, then it distorts the
investment incentives of parents. Hence, the investment in a child’s human capital devel-
opment may become inadequate. This inadequacy may have serious consequences for the
child’s future.
I find that growing up in a joint custody law regime leads on average to worse future
outcomes for children. In particular, for individuals growing up under the joint custody law
regime, the likelihood of dropping out of high school increases, and the odds of graduating
from college decreases. The labor market outcomes are equally depressed. Being exposed to
a joint custody regime reduces future real total income, the percentage income above poverty,
weeks worked, real wage income, and the likelihood of being employed. These results hold
true for the aggregate sample, the female subsample, and the male subsample. The results
are robust to the inclusion of trends in the model, which suggests that endogeneity through
unobserved heterogeneity changing over time is not driving the results.
The findings of this paper can be reconciled with the findings of the existing literature.
Nunley and Seals (2011a) argue (following Rasul 2006) that implementation of a joint custody
law leads to a weakened bargaining position for mothers. If fathers give investment in child
development lower importance than mothers, then shifting the bargaining power in favor of
fathers will lead to a lower investment in children. My results are consistent with this line
of thinking. Since, mothers have a weakened bargaining position, the investment in children
tends to be lower. Elsewhere in the literature, it has been proposed that an increased
bargaining power for mothers will lead to greater investment in children (e.g., Lundberg et
al. 1997). A lower investment in children will weaken their ability to acquire human capital
during their developmental phase, which will lead to weaker labor market outcomes in the
future. In my analysis, I find that exposing children to joint custody laws will lead to a
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higher likelihood that these children drop out of high school and to a lower likelihood that
they graduate from college. These findings provide support to the idea that joint custody
laws weaken the bargaining position of mothers, and tend to lower investment in children.
The lower labor market outcomes due to growing up in a joint custody regime can be a
result of lower human capital accumulation. Lower total income and lower wage income due
to being exposed to joint custody laws as a child also implies earning lower wage rates. A
lower likelihood of finding a job and the finding that fewer weeks are worked also support
the notion that individuals growing up in a joint custody law regime as children are having
a more difficult time later in the labor market.
Gruber (2004) suggests two linkages through which growing up in a unilateral divorce
regime might affect the likelihood of graduating college: liquidity constraints and extra
stress. I find that for the pooled sample, the odds of graduating high school increases, but
the likelihood of attending college and graduating from college decreases. Thus resource
constraints may explain lower educational attainment growing up in a joint custody regime.
Another interesting feature of the results in this paper is the large difference between
the decrease in future income of males and females. Being introduced to the joint custody
regime lowers the future real total income for the female subsample by $991 in the model
with trends. However, the decrease in future real total income for the male subsample is far
larger at $3,964. Hence, a possible resource constraint affects males significantly more than
females. We can provide two reasons for this result. First, the increase in female graduation
rates and workforce participation have been relatively recent phenomena. Since we start
our analysis in 1960, the effect of being introduced to a joint custody regime as a child may
therefore be less severe on females. The second explanation of the lower impact on females
is related to the idea of gender-specific discrimination in the allocation of resources in a
household. If female children are receiving fewer of the available resources, then a shock in
the form of a divorce and the ensuing resource constraint will be less severe for them than
for their male counterparts. Since female children already had fewer resources to begin with,
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a parental divorce affects them less than it does male children. In sum, our finding may
provide indirect evidence of gender-based discrimination with regard to resource allocation
among children. Further research into this aspect may be of interest.
Overall, I find that growing up in a joint custody regime has detrimental effects on future
educational and labor market outcomes. The existing literature suggests that weakening
the bargaining power of mothers in a household will lead to lower investment in children’s
development. My results are fully consistent with this view.
6 Conclusion
Before the introduction of joint custody laws, mothers were predominantly given the
custodial rights in the event of a divorce. The argument in favor of such a system was the
recognition that mothers tended to be the “primary caregivers”. Joint custody laws made
the awarding of custodial rights gender-neutral. Bonding and monitoring theories suggest
that a joint custody regime would be a better option than a sole custody regime because it
would provide fathers with an incentive to be emotionally closer to their children, and as a
consequence, they would be more willing to support their children financially. However, the
literature also suggests that if mothers lose their bargaining power, even if only partially, the
investment in children tends to be lower. Rasul (2006) suggests that if parental preferences
for child development are sufficiently heterogeneous, then sole custody is a better option.
Even when joint custody is optimal (under relatively homogeneous parental preference for
child development), investment in a child is maximized if the parent who is giving child
development more weight retains the majority share of the custodial rights. Hence, an equal
spread of custodial rights after divorce may not be in the best interests of a child. My
results support this argument. I do not find growing up in a joint custody law regime to be
beneficial for children.
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The literature on the economics of divorce has not focused yet on the future outcomes
of growing up in a joint custody law regime. My results show that being exposed to a joint
custody law regime leads to lower educational attainment (higher likelihood of dropping out
of high school, lower likelihood of graduating from college) and worse labor market outcomes
(lower real total income, lower real wage income, lower percentage income over poverty line
income, lower weeks worked, and lower likelihood of being employed). My results are robust
do different specifications and hold for both the male and female subsamples.
I also find indirect evidence of discriminatory resource allocation among children based
on their gender. Being introduced to joint custody as children, males are more severely
affected than females. If female children already had lower resources to begin with, then the
resource constraint after divorce does not hurt them as much as it does male children. This
may be interpreted as indirect evidence of within-household gender-based discrimination.
Although a joint custody regime is intended to serve the best interests of a child, it
appears that it is working in the opposite direction.
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